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SHOULD OR MUST?:
NATURE OF THE OBLIGATION OF STATES
TO USE TRADE INSTRUMENTS FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL, LABOUR,
AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS
STEPHEN J. POWELL*
This article examines whether customs, treaties,
and historical facts have caused the ethical human
rights obligations of economically powerful states to
assume a legal quality. The author argues that the
legal quality of these obligations may arise from the
global harm principle of international law and human
rights obligations found in treaties. As a consequence,
states may be held accountable for the human rights
violations of transnational corporations. Further, the
author examines the possibility of pursuing claims
under the U.S. Alien Tort Statutefor torts committed
in violation of international treaties as another avenue
for enforcing human rights obligations.
Cet article examine si les coutumes, les traites et les
faits historiques ont caus6 des obligations de droits de
la personne thiques des Etats economiquement
puissants pour assumer une qualit4juridique. L 'auteur
fait valoir que la qualitjuridique de ces obligations
peut provenir du principe de tort mondial du droit
international et des obligations de droits de la
personne incluses dans les traites. Par consequent, les
ttatspeuvent 6tre tenus responsables de violations des
droits de la personne dans le cas de corporations
transnationales. De plus, I'auteur examine la
possibilitM de poursuivre une cause d'action en vertu
de la Alien Tort Statute am&icaine commise en
violation de traites internationaux comme tant un
autre moyen de faire respecter les obligations des
droits de la personne.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. NATURE OF TRADE LAW'S INTERSECTION WITH HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
At the inception of the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade' in 1947, it was possible
to forgive negotiators their failure to appreciate trade's inevitable effects on human rights.
Such ignorance in the crafting of trade treaties that have transformed the world over the past
30 years into an unstoppable engine of economic growth with near fathomless power to
change the standard of living of every global citizen can no longer be countenanced. Each
new treaty not only is born into the corpus of existing public international law, including
human rights treaties and custom, but each new trade negotiation also occurs within the
factual milieu that halfa century of ever-broader trade rules has revealed.
B. TRADE'S WINNERS AND LOSERS
Trade law's inexorable growth has, as economists predicted, crcated winners and losers.
Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter called this eminently predictable process "creative
destruction,"2 the perpetual cycle by which capitalism destroys old, less efficient products
and services and replaces them with new, more efficient ones. Technological change,
Schumpeter noted, "incessantly revolutionizes the economic structurefrom within."3 Trade's
winners mostly have been transnational corporations which are able to reduce costs by
seeking out countries with a comparative advantage in their products, usually without
concern either for the human lives or the natural resources abused in that search. Trade's
biggest losers have been the human rights of workers; the environment, and, consequently
the health of women; of indigenous populations; of the poor, and of development and
developing countries generally.
C. ISSUES POSED BY THIS ARTICLE
States must assume the responsibility of delivering through their trade agreements the
human rights promised by a dozen United Nations treaties. States have been careful in
couching their human rights commitments in order to avoid, with respect to many critical
needs of individuals, any binding and measurable actions to ensure the human rights either
of their own citizens or those in other countries. The broadest human rights document is not
called, after all, the Universal Guarantee of Human Rights, but the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.4 The question raised in this article is whether, nonetheless, a combination
of treaties, customs, and historical facts have transformed human rights obligations for
economically powerful states into duties that are not solely moral in nature, but that have also
taken on penumbral legal or rule-based characteristics. The article then examines whether
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 58 U.N.T.S. 187, Can. T.S. 1947 No. 27
(entered into force I January 1948), including Annex IA, Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, 15 April 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (entered into force I January 1995)
[collectively referred to as the GA TT].
2 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper & Bros., 1942) at
81.
3 Ibid. at 83 [footnotes omitted, emphasis in original].
4 GA Res. 217(111), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) 71.
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existing enforcement mechanisms can effectively provide a remedy for violations of such
legal duties.
II. SOURCES OF LEGAL OBLIGATION
A. GLOBAL HARM PRINCIPLE
There are two sources of this penumbral legal obligation. The first is the customary
international law principle of global harm. According to John Stuart Mill,"the only purpose
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others."5 Thomas W. Pogge, in a series of essays
completed in the 1990s, concludes that each of us has a negative duty to refrain from causing
harm to others.6 When we harm others through our actions, "we become liable to rectify the
damage we have caused."7 This duty applies equally to States.
The global harm principle finds reflection in customary international environmental law
emanating from the Trail Smelter (United States of America v. Canada)8 decision, which
affirmed Canada's responsibility for the damage from copper smelter fumes that travelled
across the the horder into the state of Washington. Basing its conclusion on general
principles of international law, the Tribunal found in 1941 that "no State has the right to use
or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the
territory of another or the properties or persons therein."9 Recognition of a cross-border harm
principle carved out an important exception to the long-standing customary international law
principle - a touchstone of traditional international law - that states have unfettered
national sovereignty over natural resources and absolute freedom of the seas beyond the
three-mile territorial limit.'0 Three decades later, that concept had become so widely accepted
that Principle 21 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment" provided global scope to the Trail Smelter principle by confirming that states
have sovereign rights to exploit their natural resources, but may not do so in a manner that
causes harm to other states: "States have ... the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."' 2
State practice establishes that this customary international environmental law principle
also finds universal acceptance with respect to other human rights harm. The UN implicitly
recognized the global harm principle in 1989 with respect to activities carried out in the
5 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. by Elizabeth Rapaport (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978) at 9.
6 Thom Brooks, "Is Global Poverty a Crime?" (2006), online: Social Science Research Network (SSRN)
<http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractsid=943762> at 17, referring to Thomas W. Pogge,
World Poveryand Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities andReforms (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity;
Maiden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002) at 130.
7 Ibid.
8 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (Int'l Arb. Tribunal 1938), 1938 (Int'l Arb. Tribunal 1941) [Trail Smelter].
9 Ibid. at 1965.
10 See Edith Brown Weiss, "Global environmental change and international law: The introductory
framework" in Edith Brown Weiss, ed., Environmental Change andlnternational Law: New Challenges
and Dimensions (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1992) 3 at 7-12.
16 June 1972, UN Doe. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, 11 I.L.M. 1416.
12 Ibid. at 1420.
territory of a State in its declaration that "States of origin shall take appropriate measures to
prevent or, where necessary, to minimize the risk of transboundary harm" and, if such harm
nonetheless occurs, "the State of origin shall make reparation for appreciable harm."13 To this
end, Frank J. Garcia argues that the moral obligations that require a liberal state to do justice
in domestic social arrangements, namely the obligations to its citizens have to one another
in their domestic social relationships, attach with equal force with respect to the transnational
economic relations of that state. 4 Garcia reasons from the general conception of justice
articulated by John Rawls to assert that "[i]nternational social and economic inequalities are
just only if they result in compensating benefits for all states, and in particular for the least
advantaged states."15 Thus situated as an element of distributive justice, Rawlsian theory
offers additional support for the global harm principle that this article posits as the penumbral
legal debt the economically powerful states owe to those elements of civil society harmed
by the global activity of these states.
In the aftermath of World War II, the major powers imposed the present global
institutional order known as the Bretton Woods System, consisting of the International
Monetary Fund to regulate exchange rates, the World Bank to finance development, and the
GA TT(now the World Trade Organization (WTO)) to regulate trade. 6 To manage the peace
and prevent future war, these powers also created the UN. While these institutions at their
creation foretold a stable economic and financial system in which every nation had an equal
opportunity to develop to its full potential, the existence of development, poverty, disease,
regional conflict, genocide, and other human rights disasters is now undeniable. In the face
of these now foreseeable, inevitable, and avoidable effects on human rights, the affluent
states have maintained this same institutional order, despite the presence of viable
alternatives that do not cause these human rights harms.
The WTO "has enabled the exacerbation of deaths from global poverty through monetary
agreements that favour affluent states at the cost ofpoor states." 7 Additionally, "protectionist
exemptions insisted upon by affluent states which have 'had a huge impact on employment,
incomes, economic growth, and tax revenues in the developing world where many live on
the brink of starvation."'1 8 By perpetuating a global order whose foreseeable effects are
widespread human rights violations and whose effects are avoidable because viable
alternatives exist that do not cause such violations, affluent states have caused harm to
others, and have in fact committed human rights violations. For these reasons, the major trade
powers have a negative duty to ameliorate the human rights their global institutional order
has undermined.
13 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-First Session, UN GAOR, 44th
Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/44/10 (1989), arts. 8-9.
14 Frank J. Garcia, Trade, Inequality, and Justice: Toward a Liberal Theory ofJust Trade (Ardsley, N.Y.:
Transnational, 2003) at 70.
15 Ibid. at 134.
16 On the Bretton Woods System, see John H. Jackson, William J. Davey & Alan 0. Sykes, Legal
Problems of International Economic Relations: Cases, Materials and Text, 4th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.:
West Group, 2002) at 199.
17 Brooks, supra note 6 at I I, referring to Pogge, supra note 6 at 19.
18 Brooks, ibid. at I1, quoting Pogge, ibid. at 18.
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In response to the notion that human rights conventions limit the responsibility of a state
to protect the rights of its own citizens, reliance is placed on case law that finds jurisdiction
for violation of the human rights of civil society outside a state's territory depending on
whether the state was in fact exercising jurisdiction over those persons when the violation
was committed. Even without recourse to a broader definition of "territory," the European
Commission of Human Rights looked to a relational concept of jurisdiction. An obvious
example is the exercise of control by a state's armed forces, as in the case of Turkey and
Turkish-occupied Northern Cyprus. 9 The global economic order exercises no less control
over the daily lives of citizens in every state, from the value of their work, the buying power
of their wages, the availability and conditions for receiving a loan, and the financial
consequences of their compliance with international trading rules. A state that has "effective
overall control" over another state's citizens is bound by human rights obligations that
otherwise are confined to acts on the state's own territory.2 °
In fact, as Garcia has observed, states also have expanded their zone of responsibility by
asserting, in both regional and global trade agreements, jurisdiction over the civil societies
of other states, from the treatment such societies must provide to transnational investments
to the types of production that the world's buyers will reward with foreign exchange earnings
upon export. Increased jurisdiction over economic affairs of the citizens of other states brings
greater requirements to make restitution for human rights violations. 2'
B. PACTA SUNTSERVANDA
The second source of the quasi-legal obligation of states to use trade instruments for the
advancement of human rights flows from their good faith obligation to implement the
commitments they have assumed by acceding to particular human rights treaties.22 At a
minimum, they have a UN Charter obligation to promote human rights, including through
international institutions "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women."23 The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,24 in addition, contributes to the increasingly customary status
of many human rights.
Two factors support broad application of the good faith principle with regard to human
rights. First, human rights treaties inherently require global effect. Of course, the refusal of
major players in the arena to become signatories will undermine the objectives of any treaty.
However, because of the natural, theological, humanist, positive law, near-spiritual origin
of human rights law, the argument that the Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of
19 Chrysostomos and Papachrysostomou v. Turkey (1991), 86A Eur. Comm'n H.R. D.R. 4 at 26.
20 Cyprus v. Turkey, no. 25781/94, [2001] IV E.C.H.R. 1, 35 E.H.R.R. 731 at para. 77. See Nicola
Vennemann, "Application of International Human Rights Conventions to Transboundary State Acts"
in Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Miller, cds., Transboundary Harm in International Law: Lessons
from the Trail Smelter Arbitration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 295 at 297.
21 See Frank J. Garcia, "The 'Fair' Trade Law of Nations, or A 'Fair' Global Law of Economic Relations?"
(2007) 45 Alta. L. Rev. 303.
22 See Vienna Convention oftthe Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679, art. 26
(entered into force 27 January 1980) [Vienna Convention].
23 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7, Prcamble.
24 Supra note 4.
Discrimination Against Women,25 for example, could protect women in France, but not
women in Nicaragua is, quite plainly, illogical. The same incoherency applies to treaties that
prohibit genocide, racial discrimination, torture, and so forth. So to contend would be
inconsistent with the object of the CEDA W even if Nicaragua had not yet become a state
party and, in fact, regardless of what states have ratified the CEDA W. Exempting certain
states from obligation under such treaties undermines the essence and the very logic of
human rights treaties, not simply their effectivencss.
The second factor favoring broad application of pacta sunt servanda is the changing
nature of the concept of territory. It is recognized that a signatory is bound to ensure
application of its international obligations only within its own territory, and that the usual
meaning of"territory" is the geographical reach of the state's political boundaries. However,
a different meaning must emerge in the face of the inevitably extraterritorial effect of trade
agreements.
Just as the Vienna Convention would find invalid a rcservation to a treaty that is
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty,26 we must find suspect the contention
of signatories to human rights treaties that the scope of the treaty is by definition limited to
the geographical territory that is under full control of the signatories. Analysts have
documented extensively the adverse effects of trade agreements on both the political and
economic human rights of civil society of the members of such treaties.2 7
Without detracting from the positive effects of trade agreements in gradually reducing
poverty, increasing environmental awareness, and overcoming infrastructural and
institutional obstacles to the advancement of human rights, the adverse effects are common
knowledge to nations that have taken on both human rights and trade obligations. In fact,
these adverse effects on the liberalization of trade transform the meaning of the effects
doctrine with respect to the extent of each signatory's human rights obligation. For example,
when the United States negotiates a chapter in a trade agreement with Costa Rica that brings
broad protections to U.S. investment in the telecommunications market of Costa Rica, U.S.
human rights obligations extend to the telecommunications workers in Costa Rica adversely
affected by the investment chapter because of the trade instrument's necessary and inevitable
effects.
This global projection of state action taken within its geographical boundaries has led to
the emergence of objective territorial principles. If a state may use these principles to extend
its traditional jurisdictional reach, the principles also must support expansion of the state's
25 18 December 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19 I.L.M. 33 (entered into force 3 September 1981) [CEDA ].
26 Vienna Convention, supra note 22, art. 19(c).
27 See e.g. Saskia Sassen, "Eeonomic Globalization and the Redrawing of Citizenship" in Berta Esperanza
Hemindez-Truyol, ed., Moral Imperialism: A Critical Anthology (New York: New York University
Press, 2002) 135 at 138; Hannah L. Meils, "A Lesson from NAFTA: Can the FTAA Function As a Tool
Improvement in the Lives of Working Women? (2003) 78 Ind. L.J. 877 at 882; Marjorie Cohn, "The
World Trade Organization: Elevating Property Interests Above Human Rights" (2001) 29 Ga. J. Int'l
& Comp. L. 427 at 428.
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traditional international obligations.28 In addition, the very nature of globalization has forced
the concept of territory to be transformed. As a result, geographical boundaries have become
less relevant not only for measuring delivery of social justice, but also for determining the
extent of a state's international obligations. Globalization has forced our usual notions of
both time and space to be reconsidered and has made the reconception of law's relationship
to territorial boundaries the central challenge of international law.29
We may also distinguish the general international law definition of jurisdiction, which
relies on territory, from that ofjurisdiction for human rights violations based on the different
objects and purposes of relevant treaties. General state jurisdiction seeks to protect the
sovereign equality and independence of states. Territorial limits best accomplish this
purpose. Human rights treaties seek, on the other hand, to protect the individual from acts
or omissions of the state. Territorial limits to jurisdiction are not relevant to these objects and
art. 31 of the Vienna Convention thus instructs us to eschew the limitations of a territorial
premise for state jurisdiction.3"
WTO case law is similar in its effect. Early trade dispute settlement panels reasoned that
GATTmembers could not act under the public health and welfare exceptions to the GATT"s
nondiscrimination prescriptions if doing so projected the member's policies beyond its
borders.3 The WTO Appellate Body rejected this line of thinking on the unassailable ground
that the GATT and other WTO agreements necessarily have effects beyond any one
member's borders. Limiting access to the GATT"s important human rights exceptions solely
to those social purposes achievable within a Member's territory would eviscerate the safe
harbours guaranteed by the trading system's public health and welfare exceptions. 2 In the
U.S. - Shrimp Products case, the WTO Appellate Body conceded that conservation of
endangered sea turtles that roam thousands of miles into the ocean was impossible through
the intra-territorial action of a single WTO member.33 Indeed, the Appellate Body required
the U.S. to engage in good faith negotiations to seek accomplishment of its environmental
protection purpose without violating the nondiscrimination principles of the WTO.34
However, in the end it approved U.S. border restrictions on shrimp caught without turtle
protective devices, thus projecting the U.S. objective to every nation that either caught or
processed shrimp and wished access to the large U.S. market.
28 Lori F. Damrosch et al., International Law: Cases and Materials, 4th ed., American Casebook Series
(St. Paul, Minn.: West Group, 2001) at 1095, refcrring to United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945).
29 See Garcia, supra note 21.
30 Vennemann, supra note 20 at 302; Vienna Convention, supra note 22, art. 31.
31 United States-Restrictions on Imports ofTuna (199 1), GATT Doc. DS2 l/R, 39th Supp. B.I.S.D. (1991 -
1992) 155 at para. 5.27, online: WTO <http://docsonline.wto.org/gensearch/asp>. The second panel
rejected this approach, although it reached the same result by finding that U.S. projection of its
environmental policy beyond its borders undermined GA77s multilateralism: United States
-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (1994), GATT Doc. DS29/R, onlinc: WTO <http://docsonline.wto.
org/gensearch/asp> at paras. 5.32, 5.38.
32 United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (1998), WTO Doc.
WT/DS58/AB/R (Appellate Body Report), online: WTO <http://docsonline.wto.org/genscarch/asp>
at para. 156 [U.S.-Shrimp Productsl.
33 Ibid. at para. 168.
34 Ibid. at paras. 170-72.
III. ENFORCEMENT OF DUTY
A. STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES BY TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
I. TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS SHOULD BE TREATED AS STATES,
NOT AS INDIVIDUALS
Transnational corporations (TNCs) cause substantial human rights violations by polluting
air and water, and by using natural resources beyond the ability of these resources to sustain
themselves. They also secure patents over the traditional knowledge of indigenous
populations without compensation, co-opt governments of smaller economies into selling
rights to the future livelihood of their civil societies, and violate the core labor rights of their
workers. Amy Sinden has argued that the ability of TNCs to exercise such extensive control
over the well-being of civil society requires that we treat TNCs not as private individuals,
but rather as governmental entities.3" The multinational food company Nestld S.A. would not,
by this logic, somehow literally be bound by human rights treaties signed by Switzerland.
The theory does argue, however, that those harmed by human rights violations committed
by TNCs may hold the country ofregistration responsible for those violations, wherever they
occur. Failure of the state to employ the civil and criminal jurisdiction that international law
authorizes the state to exercise over its corporations amounts to state-sanctioned violation
of human rights by the TNC.36
By reference again to the Vienna Convention's prohibition of reservations that are
inconsistent with the object and purpose of a treaty, signatories could not have intended to
escape responsibility for the human rights violations oftheir citizens because the state simply
chose not to regulate the TNC with respect to a particular activity.7
2. JURISDICTION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
OVER HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS OF TNCS
This penumbral or constructive state responsibility for the human rights violations of
TNCs arguably confers jurisdiction on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR)
for human rights violations committcd by TNCs. In fact, a state which is a signatory to the
American Convention on Human Rights38 has violated the Convention by failing to police
and prevent the violation by an entity within its control. Enforcement is not thereby
automatically ensured, because many important countries of registration of TNCs, such as
35 Amy Sinden, "The Power of Rights: Imposing Human Rights Duties on Transnational Corporations for
Environmental Harms" in Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu & Tom Campbell, eds., The New
Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press) [forthcoming in 2007], online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=925679>.
36 International law generally recognizes jurisdiction of a state over foreign branches or subsidiaries of
legal persons organized under its laws, whose principal place of business is located in their territories,
or which nationals of the state own. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 414 (1987) at Reporters' Note 4.
37 Vienna Convention, supra note 22, art. I9(c).
38 22 November 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9 I.L.M. 99 (entered into force 18 July 1978).
ALBERTA LAW REVIEW (2007) 45:2
OBLIGATION OF STATES TO USE TRADE INSTRUMENTS 451
the U.S. and Canada, have not ratified the American Convention on Human Rights, much less
its San Salvador Protocol on economic, social, and cultural rights." The fact remains that the
state has committed a violation of its human rights obligation, imposed through the global
harm and pacta sunt servanda principles, as a result of the actions of its transnational
corporate agent.
B. NATIONAL TORT CLAIM FOR CUSTOMARY HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
I. IN GENERAL
The recently rcvived U.S. Alien Tort Statute40 is available to litigants in U.S. federal courts
to enforce certain duties of states and corporations to protect human rights. The ATS calls
upon the concepts of customary international law and pacta sunt servanda to establish
positive law prohibiting human rights violations, such as those that occur as a direct result
of the global trading system created and perpetuated by states and corporations. By its
resurrection as an instrument of human rights enforcement, the A TSjoins a line of precedent
extending from the 18th century, more recently reconstituted after World War 11 in the form
of the Nuremberg trials and other reparation arrangements sought soon thereafter from the
Soviet Union, Castro's Cuba, and South Africa for human rights violations. More recent
reparations claims involve slave labour, forced prostitution and sterilization, torture, illegal
occupation, looting of art works, and expropriation of land.
Latin America has a particularly strong history of judicially-enforced reparation in the
form of its amparo suit, which permits federal courts to provide remedies to citizens for
violations by the state of their constitutional rights.4' Many of these constitutional protections
sound in human rights, which explains the basis for the guarantee of the amparo suit by the
American Convention on Human Rights.42 Because the ATS has only recently joined the
ranks of judicial enforcement instruments, this article will concentrate on its fascinating, if
limited, jurisprudence.
Landmark decisions in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala43 and Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain44 brought
a flood of ATS human rights cases to U.S. federal courts.45 This inundation resulted from the
39 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area ofEconomic Social and
Cultural Rights, 14 November 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69,28 I.L.M. 156 (entered into force 16 November
1999) [San Salvador Protocol].
40 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) [ATS]: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
41 Bruce Zagaris, "The Amparo Process in Mexico" (1998) 6 U.S.-Mex. L.J. 61.
42 Supra note 39, art. 25.1;Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25 (1) and 7(6)American
Convention on Human Rights) (1987), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A), No.
8 at para. 32, Inter-American Yearbook on Human Rights: 1987 (Dordrecht, Neth.: Martinus Nijhoff)
at 750.
43 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) [Filartiga].
4 542 U.S. 692 (2004) [Sosa].
45 Carolyn A. D'Amore, "Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Alien Tort Statute: How Wide Has the Door
to Human Rights Litigation Been Left Open?" (2006) 39 Akron L. Rev. 593 at 600: courts granted ATS
jurisdiction in only two of 20 cases filed between 1789 and 1980.
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original drafters' indeterminate intent,46 coupled with the ambiguous holding in Sosa.47 The
crux of the uncertainty about the A TS hinges on both personal and subject matter jurisdiction,
that is, the elemental questions of who is subject to A TS jurisdiction and which causes of
action remain.
2. THE SUBJECT-MATTER QUESTION - WHAT VIOLATIONS ARE
ACTIONABLE UNDER THE A TS?
An A TS claim must meet three conditions: (1) the plaintiff is alien to the United States;
(2) the violation is tortious; and (3) the tort violates the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.48 Jurists debate whether the A TS itself creates a cause of action or if a separate
statute is necessary to find cause.49 Furthermore, it is unclear whether the tort need violate
the law of nations that existed when the A TS came into effect in 1789, or if the tort can arise
from since-developed custom.5"
Many scholars of the ATS hoped for some clarity when the Supreme Court granted
certiorari for Sosa, but it unfortunately left them with a question for every answer.5 The
Court conceded the ATS itself does not create a cause of action, yet it inferred that the
legislature intended for the statute to have practical effect.52 Therefore, it granted jurisdiction
forATS claims fitting within the paradigm of present-day customary international law from
that of the law of nations that existed in the late-eighteenth century. In other words, an ATS
suit is permissible if the alleged violation assumes today the same degree of importance as
the concerns that existed when Congress passed the A TS (such as piracy and crimes against
ambassadors).
As a result of Sosa and the lack of specificity as to which claims are actionable, doubt
remains as to what claims will find favour with the federal courts. It seems that the advice
46 HTv. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 at 1015 (2d Cir. 1975), notingthatthe First Congress created theATS
with virtually no legislative history, "[the A TS] is a kind of legal Lohengrin; although it has been with
us since the first Judiciary Act ... no one seems to know from whence it came" [references omitted].
47 Sosa, supra note 44 at 713: "The parties and amici here advance radically different historical
interpretations of this terse provision." See D'Amore, supra note 45 at 594, suggesting that "[t]he
Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain neither threw the door open nor shut it firmly.
Instead, this decision perpetuates the uncertainty surrounding the ATS by leaving the door slightly ajar,
suggesting that the issue will be revisited frequently as human rights issues push to the forefront of the
national conscience" [footnotes omitted]. See James Boeving, "Half Full ... or Completely Empty?:
Environmental Alien Tort Claims Post Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain" (2005) 18 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev.
109 at I I 1-12, noting that "[w]hether or not the Court aetually clarified the scope of the ATS, and the
decision's potential future implications, will no doubt be the subject of debate for some time to eome."
48 Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542 at 548 (Dist. Ct. D.C. 1981).
49 Boeving, supra note 47 at 135. The author points out that the Court did not discuss what would happen
in cases involving violations of U.S. treaties.
50 Sosa, supra note 44 at 71: the Court refers to William Blackstone's limited law of nations derived from
English eommon law at the time, which included "violation of safe conducts, infringemcnt of the rights
of ambassadors, and piracy."
51 Boeving, supra note 47 at 111-12.
52 Sosa, supra note 44 at 724-25.
53 Ibid.
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that held true in Paul v. Avri1 4 remains valid - a well-pleaded tort that violates the law of
nations is sufficient to provide a cause of action.The good news for the human rights
community is that many human rights violations that arise from the global trading system
meet this standard. Despite Scalia J.'s taunt that the Sosa decision represents the "latest
victory for [the Supreme Court's] Never Say Never Jurisprudence,"55 in actuality, the courts
have dismissed many A TS claims since Sosa.56 A recent decision by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals in a case involving egregious trade-related activities, Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,5 7
may clarify which human rights violations are actionable.The Ninth Circuit lays out the facts
in an eye-opening manner:
Rio Tinto is an international mining group headquartered in London. During the 1960s, Rio Tinto sought to
build a mine in the village of Panguna on Bougainville, an island province of PNG. Rio Tinto offered the
PNG government 19.1 percent of the mine's profits to obtain its assistance in this venture.
Operations commenced in 1972. Each day, approximately 300,000 tons of ore and waste rock were blasted,
excavated and removed from the mine, producing 180,000 tons of copper eoncentrate and 400,000 ounces
of gold annually. The resulting waste products from the mine polluted Bougainville's waterways and
atmosphere and undermined the physical and mental health ofthe island's residents. In addition, the islanders
who worked for Rio Tinto, all of whom were black, were paid lower wages than the white workers recruited
off island and lived in "slave-like" conditions.
In November 1988, Bougainvilleans engaged in acts of sabotage that forced the mine to close. Rio Tinto
sought the assistance of the PNG government to quell the uprising and reopen the mine. The PNG army
mounted an attack on February 14, 1990, killing many civilians. In response, Bougainvilleans called for
secession from PNG, and 10 years of civil war ensued.
During the I 0-year struggle, PNG allegedly committed atrocious human rights abuses and war crimes at the
bchest of Rio Tinto, including a blockade, aerial bombardmcnt ofcivilian targcts, burning of villages, rape
and pillage. Plaintiffs assert that the war has ravaged the island and devastated its inhabitants. Thousands
54 812 F. Supp. 207 at 212 (Dist. Ct. Fla. 1993): the plain language of the statute, with phrases such as
"committed in violation" of the law of nations, implies a cause of action.
55 Sosa, supra note 44 at 750, Scalia J., concurring in part [emphasis in original, references omitted]:
This Court seems incapable of admitting that some mattcrs - any matters - are none of its
business.... In today's latest victory for its Never Say Ncver Jurisprudence, the Court ignores its
own conclusion that the ATS provides only jurisdiction, wags a finger at the lower courts for going
too far, and then - repeating the same formula the ambitious lower courts themselves have used
- invites them to try again.
56 Bowoto v. Chevron, 2007 U.S. Dist. 59374 (QL) (N.D. Cal. 2007) (brutal attacks by Nigcrian
Government forces against protestors at Chevron oil platform did not amount to crime against
humanity); Matar v. Dichter, 500 F.Supp.2d 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (suit against director of Israeli security
forces for targeted killings of over 500 suspected terrorists and bystanders dismissed based on sovereign
immunity); Corrie v. Caterpillar Inc., 403 F.Supp.2d 1019 (W.D. Wash. 2005), aff'd. 2007 U.S. App.
22133 (QL) (9th Cir. 2007) (suit for killing family members with bulldozer purchased by U.S. and
operated by Israeli Defense Forces to demolish homes in Palestinian Territories dimissed under political
question doctrine).
57 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007) [Rio Tinto].
of Bougainville's residents have died; those who survived suffer health problems, are internally displaced
and live in care centers or refugee camps or have fled the island.
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Rio Tinto contains both egregious abuses of jus cogens norms and violations that
encompass grayer areas of customary international law, all based on trade and investment
activities. The District Court found that the complaint stated actionable ATS claims of racial
discrimination, violations of the laws of war, and violation ofthe UnitedNations Convention
on the Law of the Sea.59 However, based primarily on a Statement of Interest filed by the
U.S. Department of State, the District Court dismissed all claims on grounds of
nonjusticiable political questions and, alternatively, on the basis of international comity and
the act of state doctrine.6 °
Noting that its review of the appeal of the lower court's dismissal required only a finding
that one of the claims was a non-frivolous violation of the law of nations, the appellate court
separated the alleged violations into three categories: (1) war crimes and crimes against
humanity; (2) racial discrimination; and (3) environmental destruction. 6' Because the first set
of allegations involved well-established violations of international norms, the appellate court
adjudged them actionable under the ATS and did not analyze them in detail. 62 The Rio Tinto
opinion thus primarily focused on the customary nature of the racial and environment claims.
The District Court had dismissed claims of racial discrimination under the act of state
doctrine. The appellate court reversed this decision based on its view that racial
discrimination, like war crimes and crimes against humanity, comprised "the least
controversial core" of today's ATS jurisdiction.63 The Court found systematic racial
discrimination to be ajus cogens violation that cannot have international law protection as
a sovereign act. 64
The appellate court did not view the environmental devastation claim, based on the
UNCLOS, as rising to the level of ajus cogens violation, but rather ruled that the act of state
doctrine did not for that reason necessarily shield the state from prosecution. Because
approximately 150 nations have ratified the UNCLOS, the appellate court held that the treaty
thereby codified customary international law and permitted an ATS claim.
6
58 Ibid. at 1198. The Court, ibid. at 1202, also noted that Re Marcos Estate, 25 F.3d 1467 at 1475 (9th Cir.
1994) accepted the requirement that the ATS "creates a cause of action for violations of specific,
universal and obligatory international human rights standards which confer fundamental rights upon all
people vis-a-vis their own governments."
59 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force 16 November 1994)
[UNCLOS].
60 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 221 F. Supp.2d 1116 at 1139-63, 1199-1209 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
61 Rio Tinto, supra note 57 at 1198.
62 Ibid. at 1202.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid. at 1209, quoting Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 at 717-18(9th Cir. 1992) in which
the Court held that "the Foreign Relations Law Restatement 'identif[ies] jus cogens norms prohibiting
... systematic raeial discrimination' and that "'international law does not recognize an act that violates
jus cogens as a sovereign act."'
65 Rio Tinto, ibid. at 1210.
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Another important issue from Rio Tinto was the affirmation of the lower court's finding
that the A TS does not require an exhaustion of local remedies.66 This interpretation opens the
door widely to litigation, largely because of the difficult nature of trying to remedy a state
violation within that same state, or the hurdles that exist in pursuing a case in a national
court.
67
3. THE PERSONAL JURISDICTION QUESTION -
WHETHER STATES, INDIVIDUALS, OR CORPORATIONS ARE LIABLE
Sosa nearly disregarded the question of which states, private actors, or corporate entities
fit within the scope of liability under the ATS.6 8 The overall message of the courts
consistently states that in the realm ofjus cogens virtually anyone can be held accountable,
but for "lesser" violations the question of who can be brought under the ATS is still
unresolved.
For corporations, however, the gate of liability seems to be swinging open a little wider.
Sosa is now a litigation tool that enforces limited but binding standards on transnational
corporations. 69 These corporations also face vicarious liability claims for aiding and abetting
human rights violations when a state perpetrator is unreachable because of sovereign
immunity.7" Federal courts have allowed claims with only the requirement that the
corporations knowingly provided "practical assistance or encouragement that has a
substantial effect on the perpetration of a crime."'" Examples of such claims include
environmental torts, expropriated property claims, and other human rights violations
committed by host governments.72 Even if many of these claims ultimately fail in court, the
deterrent effect of exposure to litigation that results in lawyer fees and bad press may start
a trend of settlements and preventive corporate responsibility.73
66 Ibid. at 1214. The Rio Tinto Court addresses the Supreme Court's warning of allowing too many claims
under the A TS, but refuses to infer a mandatory exhaustion requirement until Congress or the Supreme
Court does so.
67 Rio Tinto, ibid. at 1214, quoting from Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877 at 892 (7th Cir. 2005),
Cudahy J., dissenting in part: "There can be little doubt but that the legal remedies ... were indeed
ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate or obviously futile under any applicable
exhaustion provisions."
68 Boeving, supra note 47 at 133, pointing out the neglected issue of personal jurisdiction: "[Tihe Court
did not address whether liability under the ATS extends to private actors, such as corporations."
69 D'Amorc, supra note 45 at 626-29.
70 Rio Tinto, supra note 57 at 1202-203, noting the ATS uses federal common law, which contains
established concepts of vicarious liability.
71 Doe I v. Unocal Corp, 395 F.3d 932 at 947 (9th Cir. 2002).
72 Konrad L. Cailteux & B. Keith Gibson, "'Alien Tort Statute' Shakedown: Court Must Arrest New
Attempt to Expand Mischievous U.S. Law" (2005) 20 Legal Backgrounder No. 3 at 1, online:
Washington Legal Foundation <http://www.wlf.org/upload/01 1405LBCailteux.pdf>.
73 See Rachel Chambers, "The Unocal Settlement: Implications for the Developing Law on Corporate
Complicity in Human Rights Abuses," online: Global Policy Forum <http://www.globalpolicy.org/
intljustice/atca/2005/09unocal.pdf>.
4. SUMMARY OF ALIEN TORTSTATUTE
Although the scope of A TS jurisdiction remains unshaped, it clearly reaches extreme
violations of human rights, such as war crimes, systematic racial discrimination, torture, and
otherjus cogens human rights violations. Moreover, the courts now seem willing seriously
to analyze whether other human rights abuses, such as health and environment questions,
should be actionable as equally fundamental. The Rio Tinto Court turned to an international
law restatement and a multilateral environmental agreement as a basis for determining
today's law of nations. It is likely that courts in the U.S. states will look to other international
agreements in placing the ATS among other national judicial remedies, including the
important amparo action, for human rights violations that may be unenforceable at the
international level.
IV. CONCLUSION
The clear historical record of 60 years of operation of the modern system of financial and
economic instruments created by the major trading nations after World War II proves the
severely adverse effects of the system on much of the world's population. Far too many
people suffer from poverty, lack of clean air to breathe or clean water to drink, continued
lack of access to essential medicines to treat modern plagues such as HIV-AIDS, overt racial
and sexual discrimination at work, dying indigenous cultures that had survived thousands of
years before the Bretton Woods System, and continued marginalization from political and
economic attention.
Combined with the principles of global harm and pacta sunt servanda, this undeniable,
inevitable, predictable, and preventable record of globalization's "creative destruction"
creates an enforceable legal obligation on the part of economically healthy states to make
reparations for the human rights violations caused by their actions and by those of the TNCs
subject to their jurisdiction. In extreme cases, regional human rights courts and national
courts have enforced this obligation, using both tort and constitutional rights deprivation
theories to find jurisdiction.
Important issues must yet be resolved. To what extent will a state's border restrictions in
support of human rights find justification in WTO public health and welfare exceptions and,
importantly, its public morals clauses? WTO panels recently have explored these issues in
an important case involving internet gambling.74 Difficulties in enforcement of human rights
obligations persevere in part because of limited ratification of the American Convention on
Human Rights and, afortiori, its San Salvador Protocol that clarifies the indivisibility of
economic, social, and cultural human rights from those that seek primarily civil and political
freedoms. In resolving these remaining hurdles, officials should be mindful that the
obligation of states to use trade instruments for the advancement of human rights is decidedly
rule-based in nature - a legal, not solely a moral, duty.
7 United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (2005),
WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R (Appellate Body Report ), online: WTO <http://docsonline.wto.org/
gen search/asp?>. For a discussion of this issue, see Stephen J. Powell, "The Place of Human Rights
Law in World Trade Organization Rules" (2004) 16 Fla. J. Int'l L. 219.
ALBERTA LAW R-EVIEW (2007) 45:2
